holds promise for the development of general and parsimonious theories of human motivation and work behavior.

Our third comment addresses Camara and Schneider's (1994) concerns that most of the research on integrity tests is conducted by test publishers. There is no inherent reason why the credibility of in-house research should be questioned. Many test publishers are I/O psychologists in good standing. In addition to I/O psychologists, many personality psychologists with good reputations are tied directly to or serve as consultants to various integrity test publishers. Furthermore, to date we have seen no evidence that negative findings have been withheld. All research is sponsored to some degree, and all primary studies are potentially affected by biases and errors (Hunter & Schmidt, 1990; Schmidt, 1992). There is also a catch-22 here. APA test standards and APA ethical standards require test authors to conduct research on the validity of the instruments they offer. Yet, when they do so, their studies are rejected as being of no scientific value because of their connections to the instrument. So they are damned if they conduct validity studies and damned if they don't.

We hope the empirical findings on integrity tests will contribute to advances in understanding the role of personality in behaviors on the job. Future reviews of integrity testing should base their conclusions on all available data.

REFERENCES


Why Integrity Testing Remains Controversial

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Camara and Schneider's (February 1994) article "Integrity Tests: Facts and Unresolved Issues" provided a balanced overview of current issues pertaining to the use of integrity tests in pre-employment screening. Nevertheless, Camara and Schneider's title and their discussion of the American Psychological Association (APA) task force report (Goldberg, Grenier, Guion, Sechrest, & Wing, 1991) may leave readers with the impression that the authors have addressed most of the principal unresolved issues concerning integrity tests. To the contrary, we maintain that Camara and Schneider's review failed to get to the heart of the major concerns voiced by scientists and educated laypersons regarding the use of these measures.

Although integrity testing has provoked considerable debate among both researchers and the general public, the substantive issues underlying this debate have not always been apparent. For example, Schmidt, Ones, and Hunter (1992) asserted that "Although integrity testing...for reasons that are not entirely clear...remains controversial, the APA report may lead to greater acceptance" (p. 641, italics added). We contend that three key issues concerning integrity tests, which were largely neglected by Camara and Schneider (1994), remain unresolved. The persistence of these issues helps to explain why integrity testing remains controversial.

1. Although there is compelling evidence that many integrity tests possess above-zero validity for certain criteria, such as counterproductive behavior in the workplace (Ones, Viswesvaran, & Schmidt, 1993), there are virtually no data regarding the types of classification errors made by these measures. Most discussions of integrity tests assume that the errors made by such tests are random. But many of the criticisms directed toward integrity tests, such as the assertion that they are biased against highly religious or moral individuals (Guastello & Rieke, 1991; Lykken, 1981), imply that the classification errors made by these tests may be systematic. These arguments echo recent concerns that most paper-and-pencil measures relevant to conscientiousness, including integrity tests, assess conventionality and conformity rather than morality (Loevinger, 1994).

Moreover, these criticisms underscore the potential for the exclusion of certain individuals from occupations on the basis of characteristics that are largely or entirely unrelated to honesty. Indeed, integrity test scores are positively correlated with measures of social closeness, traditionalism, and other traits that are not clearly relevant to integrity (Lilienfeld, Andreas, Stone-Romero, & Stone, 1994). Although Camara and Schneider (1994) referred to the "problems of labeling and false positive errors that have dogged integrity tests" (p. 115), the more critical question concerns whether such errors reflect the systematic misclassification of some honest individuals as dishonest.

2. Camara and Schneider (1994) also did not address the issue of fakability—in other words, the extent to which integrity tests are susceptible to impression management. This possibility, which has been the focus of surprisingly little research, is consistent with findings that integrity test scores are positively correlated with scores on lie scales (Guastello & Rieke, 1991). In one of the few investigations of the fakability of integrity tests, Ryan and Sackett (1987) found that an integrity test modeled after existing measures was highly susceptible to faking, although the scores of participants asked to take the test "as if applying for a job" were more similar to the scores of participants asked to respond candidly than to the scores of participants asked to fake their answers. Finally, it should be noted that because many integrity tests do not contain lie scales, respondents on such tests may be able to engage in response distortion without risking detection.

A related issue that has received no research attention concerns the coachability of integrity tests, or the extent to which these tests are vulnerable to training by means of a standard set of instructions. Because most integrity tests, especially those that are overt or with a clear purpose, are highly similar to one another in content, the finding that integrity tests are amenable to coaching implies that they would be at risk for becoming obsolete as soon as the heuristics for passing them became widely known. Similarly, one of the primary liabilities of the
polygraph test is its susceptibility to easily trained countermeasures (Lykken, 1981).

3. Many writers in the integrity testing field use the same language and logic that is typically applied to ability testing. This approach, however, obscures certain important differences between integrity and ability. Moral behavior is to some extent mutable—at least so American culture maintains. Few would object to the premise that an individual who has demonstrated less than adequate integrity in the past can “go straight.” On the other hand, it would not be thought as likely that an individual who has demonstrated a lack of intelligence could “go smart.”

The fact that some individuals can alter their behavior in the moral domain is sufficient to raise questions concerning tests on which examinees are penalized for admissions of past misbehaviors. Many integrity tests, which inquire extensively about respondents’ previous history of theft and even previous temptations toward theft, will almost inevitably yield low scores for “reformed” individuals with criminal histories. Consequently, individuals with a criminal past may be “locked into” low scores on many integrity tests—although, paradoxically, this will occur only if they are honest about their past.

Some critics will respond that the application of large sample theory justifies the use of integrity tests, even at the expense of false positives. It is also true that other selection techniques, such as background checks for felony convictions, may produce results similar to those of integrity tests in this respect—although on integrity tests individuals can (unknowingly) incriminate themselves. Nonetheless, we argue that the public can and does distinguish between integrity and ability, and that this distinction is partly responsible for the growing movement, found at the level of several state legislatures, to ban integrity tests.

In summary, the integrity testing field has apparently been too quick to place a distance between integrity tests and the word *controversial*. But surely there is no hurry in this regard. Both science and the public will best be served by careful scrutiny of the principal unresolved issues concerning integrity testing.

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Unresolved Issues in Honesty and Integrity Testing

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Camara and Schneider’s (February 1994) review of the honesty and integrity testing debate was a welcome addition for psychologists who may have been wondering, “So what finally happened?” Nonetheless, we have arrived at different conclusions about the meaning of the facts and unresolved issues: (a) The construct of honesty or integrity remains vague and ill-defined after more than 50 years of research; (b) evidence for the criterion validation of honesty or integrity tests is not very compelling; and (c) it seems unlikely that the present applications of these tests will ever meet established APA ethical standards.

To begin, Camara and Schneider (1994) concluded that the establishment of the construct validity of honesty tests was basically in need of further research. Recent evidence has already emerged, however, showing that honesty measures are primarily correlated with measures of the Big Five personality construct of conscientiousness and somewhat with low anxiety and agreeableness (Ones, Schmidt, & Viswesvaran, 1993). It is well-known, however, that people in the creative and helping professions, such as artists or psychologists, often score lower on conscientiousness (Cattell, Eber, & Tatsuoka, 1970; Hogan & Hogan, 1993; Woolley & Hakstian, 1992). In light of the connection to normal personality traits, the existence of integrity as a psychological construct thus appears unlikely and is quite possibly redundant with normal personality. Unlike typical uses of integrity tests scores, normal range personality traits that are measured by the most commonly used tests do not confer value judgements or labels on the respondents, and the use of personality measures do meet APA guidelines and testing standards.

Camara and Schneider (1994) discounted the conclusions of the U.S. Congress Office of Technological Assessment (OTA; U.S. Congress, 1990) report because it focused solely on actual predictive studies of theft. The OTA was trying to decide whether the ban on lie detection devices, as stated in the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, should be extended to honesty or integrity tests. They did not mention that another unfavorable review (Guastello & Rieke, 1991) was in general agreement with the OTA results. Moreover, Ones, Viswesvaran, and Schmidt (1993) reached conclusions similar to those of Guastello and Rieke, finding that the correlation between scores on honesty constructs and documented thefts was low, between .13 and .14. The OTA further reported that 95.6% of integrity test takers who fail are incorrectly labeled as dishonest. Consequently, if more than five million job applicants and incumbents are tested each year, a conservative estimate of more than a million workers are falsely accused of having no integrity or of dishonesty each year.

Camara and Schneider (1994) did report that the typical use of integrity and honesty tests violates at least four of the ethical principles of psychologists (Principles 2.02, 2.05, 2.06, and 2.08). Although integrity tests are used for the same purpose as conventional psychological assessment, the publishers consider them to be proprietary, which makes them unavailable for independent research. We leave it to the reader to ponder how independent psychological research can occur under these conditions. Furthermore, the Association of Test Publishers (ATP) has now decided to create its own standards for these tests. What if the authors of every test or technique that does not meet APA standards established their own standards? Do scientists also need sepa-