What is “evidence” in psychotherapies?

The concept of evidence-based medicine (EBM), which originated in the early 1990s at McMaster University (Canada) and spread to the UK and North America, heralded an effort to place medicine on firmer scientific footing. EBM’s overarching goals were twofold: to establish hortatory (“thou shalt”) standards, guiding practitioners toward scientifically-supported interventions, and minatory (“thou shalt not”) standards, guiding them away from scientifically-unsupported interventions.

Soon, EBM found its way into the field of psychotherapies. Evidence-based psychotherapies are commonly conceptualized as a three-legged stool. One leg comprises the best available evidence bearing on the efficacy (beneficial effects in rigorously controlled conditions) and effectiveness (beneficial effects in real-world conditions); the other two comprise clinical expertise and patient preferences/values (see Cuijpers in this issue of the journal).

Still, as EBM’s influence has grown, a nagging question remains: how should we conceptualize evidence in psychotherapies? Although the concept of “evidence” may seem self-explanatory, interview data suggest that academicians across multiple disciplines, including social and natural sciences, often disagree sharply regarding how to define it.

Probably the most influential operationalization of the evidentiary prong of the above-mentioned stool was adopted in the mid-1990s by the American Psychological Association (APA). Initially termed empirically validated therapies and later empirically supported therapies (ESTs), this prong consists of psychotherapies, typically delivered via a manual, that have been empirically supported by multiple independent teams, ideally with offsetting theoretical allegiances. When viewed in this light, the APA EST criteria are too lax: they accord empirical support to treatments that have yielded positive findings in only two studies, and even to treatments that have yielded multiple negative findings. To enhance evidentiary rigor, the EST criteria must accommodate the full body of treatment outcome data, both positive and negative, and published and unpublished. They also must account for the methodological quality of included studies, such as sources of potential experimental bias (e.g., differential group attrition, imperfect randomization to conditions). Finally, they need to adopt statistical procedures, such as Bayesian methods, p-curve techniques, and the r (replicability) index, for gauging evidentiary strength and estimating publication bias.

Second, evidence-based guidelines must move beyond reliance on measures of symptomatic improvement, emphasized in EST criteria, to incorporate objective and subjective criteria of everyday life functioning. Some patients with major depression, for example, may display significant improvement in depressive signs and symptoms (e.g., anhedonia, guilt), yet remain impaired in work and interpersonal relationships.

Third, provisional but burgeoning data from experimental and quasi-experimental studies suggest that certain treatments, such as crisis debriefing following trauma, scarred straight interventions for conduct disorder, and suggestive techniques to recover ostensible memories of sexual abuse, are iatrogenic for some patients. Nevertheless, most evidence-based guidelines, including those for ESTs, overlook the possibility of harm. One challenge to addressing this omission is that many psychotherapy studies rely on unipolar outcome measures, which range from no improvement to substantial improvement; they must instead administer bipolar outcome measures, which can detect patient deterioration during and after treatment.
Fourth, extant evidence-based guidelines focus exclusively on outcome evidence; none considers the scientific plausibility of the treatment rationale\textsuperscript{5,9}. As a consequence, they open the door to all manner of pseudo-scientific interventions, many of which outperform waitlist or minimal treatment conditions. To be fair, the mode of action of many effective psychiatric interventions remains largely unknown. Yet, when interventions are premised on mechanisms that contradict well-established basic science, such as alterations in invisible energy fields, their scientific status should be suspect. Such procedures are unlikely to possess specific efficacy, that is, efficacy beyond placebo and other non-specific factors\textsuperscript{9}.

The analysis offered here leaves unresolved the knotty question of how these diverse sources of evidence should be synthesized and weighted when appraising interventions. Reasonable arguments can be advanced for a variety of alternative evidentiary frameworks. That said, for the discipline of psychotherapy to aspire to and attain more stringent scientific standards, it must embrace a multidimensional conceptualization of evidence, one that encompasses criteria for replicability and methodological rigor, goes beyond circumscribed indices of symptomatic improvement, accounts for potential harm, and considers all scientific evidence relevant to treatments, including basic science data bearing on treatment mechanisms.

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